Vital is the dialogue. The book of the living can only be the book of dialogue.
-Edmond Jabs, Le Parcours In leaving the book, one does not leave it: one inhabits its absence.
-Edmond Jabes, Ca suit son cours 1. The Poetics of Dialogue.
To be human is to be in dialogue. We are surrounded by dialogue, immersed in dialogue. Alone or in society, we use words, spoken and unspoken, that are addressed to others: the unnamed, indeterminate other that exists within ourselves; the living other whose face we look at as we speak; the unseen other whose voice comes to us from afar and that our words rush to meet. Our language, whether expressed or inaudible, conscious or silent, seeks to create encounters between a self and an other, between an / that speaks and a you that, as it hears what is spoken, prepares to make a response.
Starting from the fundamental difference that separates speakers-differences of history, culture, personality, gender, lifedialogue turns that difference into a relation, an encounter. It is by the very difference of the other with whom one interrelates, a difference which dialogue seeks to preserve, that one's life comes to have meaning. As Mikhail Bakhtin has shown in his writings on dialogue and dialogism, we can only experience the constituent moments of our life through its reflections in the consciousness of an other. From birth, if not before, our identities, appearances, and even our names are bestowed by others:
Everything that touches me comes to my consciousnessstarting with my name-from the exterior world, by passing through the mouth of others (the mother, etc.), with their intonation, their emotional tonality, and their values. Initially, I become conscious of myself only through others: it is from them that I receive words, forms, the tone that shapes my first image of myself. . . . As the body is initially formed in the mother's womb (in her body), so human consciousness awakens, enveloped by the consciousness of the other.'
It is not "hell that is the others," as one of Sartre's characters declares, but life. "Two voices," writes Bakhtin "are the minimum for life, the minimum for existence. . . . Only in communion, in the interaction of one person with another, can the 'man in man' be revealed, for others as well as for oneself."2 The nature of human existence and of consciousness is fundamentally determined by dialogue:
The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium. ' No consciousness is possible without the presence and intervention of the other. The way the I looks at itself, the way it perceives its actions and experiences, has no meaning if not reflected in the mirror of the other. "I am conscious of myself," Bakhtin writes, "and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of another" ("Toward a Reworking," p. 287). The world is fundamentally allotropic, for it turns in response to the motions, gestures, and words of the other. But this turning toward the other also leads back to the self, which sets in motion once again the movement out toward the "extopy," as Bakhtin calls it, of the other. A clear line of demarcation dividing self from other and consciousness from world does not exist: The act of writing for Jabes is fundamentally the act of speaking to another. The narrator of several of Jabes's books addresses his words to others who are fictional personages, with names like Sarah, Yukel, Yael, and Elya. These are characters whose lives and experiences are recounted in such minimal and laconic terms that they remain mysterious beings, enshrouded in the painful, silent enigma of their lives. In Jabes's books are also found imaginary rabbis whose "existence" is founded on quotations, the invented words Jabes has them address to their disciples and readers. As a form of dis course, the quotation is endowed with alterity, for it is a fragment that has been torn from an earlier text and embedded in a foreign textual milieu. The quotation refers nostalgically to the homeland from which it is in exile; it remains an unintegrated sign of otherness within the new text to which it has been joined. But the primary allocutionary form in Jabes's writing is the question, from which so many of his books are constructed. "The heart of dialogue," Jabes writes, "throbs with the beats of the question" (LD, p. 36). "What," "who," "why" are words that initiate a dialogue by demanding that the other respond. "Jewish is the question," Jabes writes, "indefinitely questioning itself in the answer it provokes" (LD, p. 66). More often than not the response elicited by a question in the dialogic encounter is another question. Dialogue for Jabes is the exchange of unending, unanswerable questions: "In the dialogue I seek, the answer is abolished; but, sometimes, the question is the flash of an answer" (RL, p. 42)."
Alterity dominates Jabes's books primarily because his writing is nomadic. It is the exilic speech of a wandering, deracinated people.
Since exile is founded on the absence, distance, and unpossessibility of a lost homeland, as well as on the alterity and difference of the exiled nomad wandering in alien lands, the writing of exile is also charged with otherness. The very nature of writing is to be "other" than what it represents, to exist apart from the unlocatable experiences, memories, and origins that have given it life. Thus, Jabes often speaks of the book-in-the book, that hidden, invisible writing which every book contains and which every word tries to "develop" (in the photographic sense of the term). Every one of Jabes's books is a possible fragment of a greater Book, the perfectly Other Text formed by the invisible, white writing of God. Each represents "the book imperceptibly forming itself in the book that will never be completed" (DDD, p. 25). Every blank page contains hidden in its "depths" an infinity of words that become truly "other," especially as the page becomes filled with writing. The written words push the unwritten words to the margins where they lie dormant. This silent, invisible, "other" writing also inhabits the spaces between the lines or peers out from between letters. Where there is space not covered by black ink, there otherness may lie: "White is the word for the word that writes itself" (LD, p. 107). Behind every congregation of letters is found "this interior word-anterior to all others" (LD, p. 68) or the forbidden "arriere-parole" (P, p. 39) uttered by a mute and absent God. The book is filled with holes, gaps, and lacks revealing "traces of words buried in the word" (P, p. 77). Book, page, line, word, letter are all inhabited by an unseen otherness, an effaced writing, a "contreecriture," trailing after the dark writing on the page like a white shadow.
Alterity is not only limited to the human spaces of the book. God Himself is other to Himself, to His Creation, and to man. He is the thou without a face, the incarnation of the plenitude of absence: "You are never You an empty space in which pure otherness can emerge. The universe begins with a divine absence. Genesis is the creation of alterity. In the beginning was not God, but the otherness of God. He is, Jabes writes, "thoroughly Himself in the immeasurable absence of Himself" (LD, p. 98), the "murmur of absence in absence" (LD, p. 120).
The relationship between self and other is, like so many things in Jabes's work, contradictory. The other is both present and absent. It is both an accomplice and an antagonist, the you that the I encounters and the being that it defies and flees. Both in greeting the other and in withdrawing from it, the self is involved in dialogue. Which explains why, sometimes, dialogue is both communion and exchange, on the one hand, and interruption and separation on the other. But in either One book unwrites another book by rewriting it, by bathing its subject No further mention will be made of the woman because she now inhabits the realm of silence that only the absence of words can express. But the woman is all the more present by virtue of this muteness; her image continues to haunt the narrator's memory and his writing. She is the void around which the writing dances, the absence to which all words are addressed, the dew quickly evaporated by the desert sun, the oasis rapidly overrun by sand. She is the sign of loss under which all language lives. The narrator experiences loss because he is constantly in dialogue with its pain. Whatever words he uses, they all refer to the absence which this woman has opened in his life. Jabes reminds us that knowledge-provisional, partial, and forever in the process of making and unmaking itself-can come, if it arrives at all, only through an experience of deprivation:
"Know that one enters the book only after having been dispossessed of it.
"Thus, we inhabit only our loss," he said. (LD, p. 11)
Dialogue, therefore, can only begin after it has disappeared; the other can only start to live after she has been lost. Dialogue exists in the absence of dialogue, for, according to Jabes, the non-existence of a reality guarantees its potential being: "Never has the advent occurred. It is in this 'never has occurred' that it lives."14In the pockets of reality that absence forms, as in the fissures between letters and the white spaces between written words, there are found the irretrievable, silent realities with which we are in dialogue. This may often take the form of a shared pain, a dialogic language of "unhealable wounds" ("inguerissables blessures"), for, as Jabes writes, "we speak to each other through a wound about whose origin we will always know nothing" (LD, p. 28). The encounter with the young woman, which may have only been a dream, a creation of the narrator's imagination-for, as Jabes writes, "the other is a fiction" (LD, p. 34)-touches every page and word of Le L ivre du dialogue. It is that book's subtext, its hidden, invisible writing, the absence with which it is constantly in conversation. Although the encounter discloses the failure of human relationships, it also proclaims the indominability of dialogue. As Jabes explains on the back cover of the French edition:
The cause of the failure of every dialogue is located in our inability to reveal ourselves, such as we are, to the other. A stranger facing strangers.
But dialogue exists, precisely there where, by means of the silence that creates the book, it is no longer anything but the desperate confrontation of two feeble words searching for their truth.
Of particular interest in the encounter with the young woman is the narrator's emphasis on the part silence plays in their meeting.
Silence initiates dialogue and maintains its life. In fact, the narrator of "Le Reve" participates in three kinds of dialogue, each of which is formed by silence. The first-what Jabes calls the avant-dialogue, and which he describes as a "slow or feverish preparation for dialogue" that allows us to be ready for an exchange of words about whose form and content we can know nothing in advance, except that it will be a "silent dialogue with an absent interlocutor" (LD, p. 1 7)-corresponds to the moment in "Le Reve" when the narrator opens his mind to the free associations of revery. The appearance, or more accurately the disappearance, of the young woman sets in motion a second form of dialogue which Jabes calls simply le dialogue. The very nature of dialogic speech, Jabes suggests, is to begin and end in silence. Before it really gets underway, it is quickly swallowed by the surrounding silence it has tried to break through; this dialogue, he writes, is "irreplaceable, vital, but . . . , alas, will not take place, beginning at the moment when we take leave of one another, both of us returned to our solitude" (LD, p. 17; Jabes's ellipsis). True dialogue begins at the moment of separation, when words can no longer be exchanged. Only at the moment of le avetaking, of departure, of exile can dialogue appear. Loss and absence are, thus, the preconditions for a dialogic encounter. It is the precipitous departure of the woman, however, that prepares the way for a third kind of dialogue, the apresdialogue, or "after-silence," in which words reverberate soundlessly in memory and thought. During this stage, we contemplate the hypothetical otherness of the encounter; we realize what "we could have said to the other during our exchange of words-which is more like an apprenticeship of words-potentially expressing only this silence; a silence to which every word-unfathomable, hollow, excavated in vain, self-centered-refers us" (LD, p. 17).
Aside from the necessity that the dialogue with the young woman take place in silence-for only through such muteness can dialogue exist-and aside from the narrator's surprise, ignorance, and possible inability to relate to the other, there may be yet another reason for his reluctance to give the young woman the name she asks for. By declining to answer her request, the narrator safeguards her alterity; he avoids the domination and possession that accompany nomination. To name the woman is to master her. But by refusing to reduce the woman's mysterious being to a common name, he enables her to remain enveloped in the radical difference she embodies. Human In love, the other cannot be captured or known. If we could possess or unite with the object of our love, the alterity of the other would be destroyed. We would kill the difference that is the very quality of the other that attracts us and that constitutes the essence of the other's existence. In love, the other must remain a stranger. That is why, Levinas writes, "the relationship with the other is founded on the absence of the other."' 6 Love involves loss, distance, and separation. To think otherwise is to be enslaved to a romantic notion of erotic union, to be possessed by a nostalgia for totality. "The pathos of the erotic relation," he writes, "is the fact of being two and that in that relationship the other is absolutely other. ""
In love, duality and alterity do not disappear.
Similarly, of Edmond Jabes's uninterrupted series of books and of his endless writing it can be said that they too eschew nomination, that they flee the word that names, that they seek silence rather than speech, the effacement of writing rather than writing itself. As long as lines write and unwrite themselves, as long as the book constructs and deconstructs itself, as long as the page is covered with black letters that other letters disperse, as long as the sands of the desert cover the traces of a wanderer passing by in the night, as long, that is, as the writing names and inscribes its own powerlessness to name and inscribe, the otherness of existence is protected and its exteriority and mystery preserved.
Ultimately, the dialogue of otherness that silence has inaugurated is beyond language. Writing and speech are inhospitable to the alterity of what is truly other. Is not the narrator's encounter with the young woman and the absence of a shared or exchanged speech between them-she talks, and he says nothing-proof that dialogue takes place outside of language, in the silence of a loss that words cannot express? The man and the woman are joined by what was not said, by the name that was not bestowed, by a dialogue that did not continue, by the woman who was soon not present, disappearing as suddenly as she had appeared. What was not defines what was. Moreover, it is curious that the narrator declares that he will say nothing more in his book about the woman's face and voice, although one knows that every page will carry the imprint of her trace. This is because the woman's absence can only be "expressed"
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Stamelman: The Dialogue of Absence Published by New Prairie Press through the presencing of her absence. Since she is beyond the horizon of language, the dialogue with her must continue in non-verbal, silent ways: "as if everything that had not been expressed were finally to be heard, to be read, outside of words" (LD, p. 61).
Dialogue, as a human relationship like love and friendship, is, for Jabes, established on silence and distance. The word that the Land the you exchange or that they fail to speak "owes its power, less to the certitude it designates in articulating itself, than to the lack, to the abyss, to the creative uncertainty of what is spoken" (LD, p. 45). In dialogue is found "the desperate confrontation of two feeble words" (LD, back cover). Since the fundamental reality of dialogic speech and writing is exile, these forms of human discourse express the desire for a return to a lost homeland or for the rediscovery of a familiar, yet absent face. They yearn for the impossible prenatal oneness that the trauma of birth has interrupted or for the union with God that Creation has disrupted:
Why is the cry of the newborn infant, emerging from the womb, a cry of pain? Undoubtedly, because asserting itself in its own language as a cry of life, it is already a cry of exile.
We are forever, through our words, this cry of the infant searching for a familiar face, for the warmth of a breast, for a love. (DDD, p. 84)
Thus one can only write or speak words of absence and exile: "We speak truly only in the distance. There is no word that is not alone. This separation is the unbearable absence that each word comes up against" (DDD, pp. 83-84) Yet, the distance between human beings, the separation between lovers, the white spaces between words, which enable them to be read, are in themselves a bridge. Self and other are joined together by what keeps them apart; their only link is the burden of absence and alterity that they share.
In avoiding a certain fascination with unity, Jabes, along with Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, rejects the notion that the self-other relationship is based on fusion, proximity, and continuity. Rather, it is a relation defined by strangeness and interruption, as Blanchot observes:
What is involved here and requires discussion is everything that separates me from the other, that is to say, the other insofar as I To enter into dialogue, according to Blanchot, is to face the fundamental alterity of the other, to greet "the other as other and the stranger as stranger, the other thus in its irreducible difference, in its infinite strangeness" (p. 115). The word emerging from a dialogue, where silence and distance between self and other are accepted, is not a word that joins but one that interrupts; it is a word of rupture. 4 . The Trace of the Other.
The disappearance of the young woman from the narrator's study concludes their meeting, their "face-A-face"; but it also sets in motion their unending dialogue. In her wake, the mysterious woman leaves the trace of her passage. The dialogue begun in presence continues in absence. It has an "after-life" which is that of silence and effacement, like one of Jabes's books striving to unwrite an earlier book and in its turn being rewritten by the book that follows. In the way she visits the narrator and then disappears, leaving behind only a trace of her now lost presence, the woman in Le Livre du dialogue illustrates the enigmatic visitation of the other described by Emmanuel Levinas in his discussion of "the trace of the other." Although for Levinas the other is an abstract entity of possible infinite being, whose appearance is epiphanic and transcendental-"only a being who transcends the world can leave a trace," he writes-it has certain resemblances to the young woman who, because of the mysterious way she enters and leaves the narrator's household, possesses a certain aura of epiphany and trans- The manifestation of the face is the initial discourse. Speaking is, above all else, this way of coming from behind one's appearance, from behind one's form, an opening within opening. (p. 614)
The essential starkness and bareness of this face-it is "paralysed in its nakedness" (p. 614), completely exposed and vulnerable-calls out to "me," Levinas explains. The face is a supplication that demands of "me," first and foremost, that "I" rid "myself" of consciousness, subjectivity, and egoism. The face of the absolutely other calls "me" from "myself," preventing "me" from taking refuge in "myself." It summons "me" to its being and asks that "I" assume responsibility for it. Herein lies the ethical dimension of the visitation: "The face imposes itself on me without my being able to remain deaf to its call or to forget it-without, that is, my being able to give up my obligation to be responsible for its impoverishment" (p. 615). The egocentric foundations of the self are radically questioned by the encounter: "The relation with the Other puts me in question, empties me of myself and does not stop emptying me" (p. 612). An encounter with Levinas's Other, like the narrator's meeting with the woman in "Le Reve"' is a mystery beyond meaning, an unsettling confrontation with otherness that unravels both the texture of the self and the text of the book. It is the endless dialogue with a trace that, while revealing the absence of the other, also expresses the "indelibility of being" itself (Levinas, p. 621). At the edge of the desert and its expanse of silent, empty space the dialogue must end. But since silence does not terminate dialogue, but only prolongs it, speech will be taken up by nothingness, one neant addressing the other. It has been the task of Le Livre du dialogue to express the truth that there can be no dialogue, no "warm breath," without silence; and no silence, no "cold breath," without dialogue. Always, there is some otherness to be addressed, or some exteriority to be perceived, or something beyond the self that calls out for attention, or some migrant, fugitive other that my speech journeys to find. Language, as B arthes reminds us, "is born of absence.." 20 Where there is alterity, there is dialogue. As long as there exists some being to whom I can say "you," some creature that summons me from out of myself, some voice that calls for me to answer, then I will live in dialogue.
The presence of the other is perpetual. Even when absent, it exists as the absence to which I direct my thoughts and address my words. The act of contemplating or remembering the other, even as I acknowledge its absence, establishes a dialogue founded on distance, silence, and lack. It is precisely the inability to forget-to allow absence to create blankness or non-existence-that gives life to the otherness that sustains the dialogic encounter. The writer and the Jew in Edmond Jabes's work are in dialogue with loss only because they are unable to forget the otherness of this loss insofar as it is evoked by "the desperate confrontation of two feeble words searching for their truth." As long as alterity is remembered, dialogue-that of books, of words, of writing, of silence-is endless; for as the "final" words ofLe 
